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Abstract
Social insurance schemes di¤er according to the relationship between contri-
butions and bene…ts. Bismarckian systems provide earnings-related bene…ts,
while Beveridgean systems o¤er ‡at payments. The conventional wisdom is
that with factor mobility poor people have incentives to move towards Bev-
eridgean countries. Consequently, Beveridgean regimes would not be sus-
tainable under economic integration. This paper studies the validity of such
a conjecture within a simple model. It is shown that mobility does have a
signi…cant impact on social protection. However, the equilibrium patterns
that can emerge are more complex and diversi…ed than the initial conjecture
suggests. In some cases, the equilibrium may even imply that all the poor
move to the Bismarckian country.
JEL Classi…cations: H23, H70
Keywords: social insurance, tax competition, mobility, economic inte-
gration.
1 Introduction
Economic integration is often perceived as a threat to national redistributive
policies. This allegation is widespread, in particular within the context of
European construction. It does not only concern tax and transfer policies
per se, but extends to social insurance systems at least as long as they
involve some redistribution.1
Political scientists tend to classify social protection systems according
to the relation between contributions and bene…ts. They distinguish three
economic systems on the basis of their bene…t rules.2 The …rst rule implies
targeted bene…ts aimed at those in proven need and providing assistance
bene…ts. Under the second rule, all residents are entitled to basic secu-
rity bene…ts which are usually established on a ‡at rate basis. The third
rule consists of contribution based, corporatist bene…ts. Eligibility then re-
quires some previous spell of employment and bene…ts are related to income
(through the contributions). To these three rules, one could add mixed sys-
tems such as those where bene…ts depend on earlier contributions but also
include a ‡at rate component.
Besides the bene…t rule, another feature of a social protection system is
its size and particularly its relative size, compared to GDP. Table 1 shows
how a number of EU countries can be characterized along theses two dimen-
sions. Roughly speaking, targeted and basic social bene…ts are prevalent in
Anglo-Saxon countries, where the overall size of programs is small. Bismar-
ckian rules are applied in Continental Europe and particularly in Germany
and France. In Nordic countries, social protection is traditionally generous
and redistributive; they use mixed bene…t rules. Consequently, it appears
1See Cremer and Pestieau (2003) for a survey.
2See e.g., Esping-Andersen (1990).
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Redistribution (decreasing degree)
Targeted Flat-rate Mixed Bismarckian
Size of social Anglo-saxon
protection countries
(increasing degree)
Germany
Scandinavian France
countries
Table 1: Classi…cation of social protection systems according to size and
redistribution.
that the European Union consists of welfare states with a wide variety of
social insurance schemes.
In this paper, we focus on two rules: the ‡at rate bene…t rule, also
called Beveridgean and the earnings-related rule, also called Bismarckian.
These are two polar cases with regard to the redistributive character of
social protection systems. The Beveridgean rule is highly redistributive and
achieves complete equalization of bene…ts. Under the Bismarckian system,
on the other hand, no redistribution occurs.3 The fundamental question we
examine is whether a Beveridgean system can survive upon integration with
a Bismarckian country. Put di¤erently, we want to study whether Bismarck
and Beveridge are compatible within a economic union.
While we are interested in their resistance to economic integration, one
should keep in mind that di¤erent types of social protection have di¤erent
3Means testing is not explicitly introduced; in our simple setting (with only two types
and without labor market distortions) it is not a relevant alternative. One can think of
the means-tested rule as an even more extreme form of the Beveridgean one. Speci…cally,
under means testing a ‡at bene…ts is given to families with income below a certain level.
The results in Section 4 can then be interpreted as pertaining to a policy of targeting.
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implications in a number of other aspects, namely e¢ciency, equity and
political sustainability. A word on the literature dealing with these aspects
can thus be useful.
The interplay between equity and e¢ciency in this context is by now well
known. Consider the utilitarian case for the sake of illustration. When there
is no e¢ciency loss full redistribution is optimal, and the Beveridgean rule
appears to dominate. E¢ciency costs are a …rst reason for not adopting a
100 % Beveridgean system; some relation between bene…ts and contributions
can alleviate the distortionary e¤ect of the taxes levied to …nance the sys-
tem. A second reason why even a utilitarian social planner would be in favor
of a mitigated system is the need of political support. In short, by involving
the middle class in the social protection system, it is possible to obtain its
support in favor of rather generous programs; see Casamatta et al., (2000).4
The bene…t rule has also been shown to a¤ect the equilibrium unemployment
rate in the e¢ciency wage literature; see Goerke (1999). A further argument
for a Bismarckian system is provided by Cremer and Pestieau (2000) and
Casamatta et al., (2001) who study the reform of a (pay-as-you-go) retire-
ment system following a demographic shock. They show that entitlements
based on Bismarckian contributive taxes can protect the transition genera-
tions and ensure a smoother sharing of the burden of adjustment between
generations.
Finally, there is the question, on which we focus in this paper, of the
relative resistance of Bismarckian and Beveridgean systems when factors
become mobile. This issue has been studied by Cremer and Pestieau (1998)
in a setting where the size of social protection is determined through major-
ity voting. However, these authors concentrate on symmetric settings where
4See also De Donder and Hindriks (1998).
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all countries are of the same type. This setting is not appropriate to study
integration of countries with di¤erent types of social protection systems.
In this paper, we are interested in such asymmetric con…gurations which
appear to be most relevant in reality; see Table 1.
Our paper also di¤ers from the bulk of tax competition literature5 in that
we explicitly allow for the possibility of corner solutions (for the migration
equilibria). The existing studies typically concentrate on interior solutions.
To achieve such an equilibrium they introduce some additional features like
a public good, decreasing returns to scale or mobility cost. This, makes the
results di¢cult to interpret. In the current setting, we do not want to assume
away corner solutions in order to get crisper results and to understand the
impact of social insurance competition per se.
The conventional wisdom is that with factor mobility poor people have
incentives to move towards Beveridgean countries. Consequently, Beveridgean
regimes would not be sustainable; they would have to adapt or to perish.
When private schemes are available, the dismantling of a Beveridgean sys-
tem can be viewed as its substitution by a Bismarckian system. We show
that mobility does have a signi…cant impact on social protection. However,
the equilibrium patterns that can emerge are more complex and diversi…ed
than the initial conjecture suggests. In some cases, the equilibrium may even
imply that all the poor move to the Bismarckian country. Furthermore, the
outcome of such a tax competition is shown to depend on the speci…c nature
of the policy (purely redistributive or involving insurance) and the extent of
coverage of social insurance. In addition, we argue that the type of mobility
(the rich or poor) and the objective of national governments (concern for
natives or residents) do have an impact on the social protection pattern that
5Recent surveys include Cremer et al. (1996), Wellig (2000), Hau‡er (2001), and
Cremer and Pestieau (2003).
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emerges under integration.6
In the main part of this paper, we assume that only the low income
individuals move and that the social planner is only concerned by the utility
of the natives. Alternative objectives and mobility pattern are discussed in
Section 6.
2 De…nitions and notation
Consider a simple setting with two countries indexed by ® and ¯, for re-
spectively Bismarck and Beveridge. They have di¤erent types of social
protection systems characterized by the implied link between contributions
and bene…ts. There are two types of individuals, indexed by i = 1; 2, who
di¤er only in their wage, wi, with w1 < w2. Each individual inelastically
supplies one unit of labor. Consequently, there are no labor market dis-
tortions associated with taxation. When migration is allowed for, we have
to distinguish the number of natives from the number of residents in each
country. Let Lji denote the number of natives of type i = 1; 2 in country
j = ®; ¯. We assume:
L®1 = L
®
2 = ±; and L
¯
1 = L
¯
2 = 1:
In words, initially the proportion of each type of individuals is the same and
equal to one half in both countries. The number of natives of either type in
country ¯ is normalized at one; it is equal to ± > 0 in country ®, where ±
may di¤er from one.
6Some of Cremer and Pestieau (1998)’s results are also at odds with the conventional
wisdom. For instance, they show that within a symmetric setting, Bismarckian systems
do not necessarily resist to tax competition better than Beveridgean ones. However, they
have no speci…c result for the case where the integration involves a Bismarckian and a
Beveridgean country.
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Assume that only individuals of type 1 are mobile and that there is no
moving cost. Denote the number of residents of this type by Nj1 and observe
that
0 · Nj1 · (1 + ±) j = ®; ¯:
When Nj1 = (1 + ±), all the poor have moved to the considered country j.
Alternative settings will be considered in the subsequent sections. In all
of them the same concept of migration equilibrium is used and it is therefore
convenient to de…ne this equilibrium up front and in a generic way. Denote
the vector of instruments used in country j by P j and the utility of type 1
individuals by:
'®1
³
P®; P ¯; N®1 ;N
¯
1
´
;
recall that i = 1 refers to the mobile poor. A migration equilibrium is given
by:7
eN®1 ³P®; P ¯´ and eN¯1 ³P®; P ¯´
such that
eN®1 + eN¯1 = (1 + ±); 0 · eNj1 · (1 + ±) for j = ®; ¯;
and
'®1
³
P®; P¯ ; eN®1 ; eN¯1 ´ = '¯1 ³P®; P¯ ; eN®1 ; eN¯1 ´ (interior solution)
or
'®1
³
P®; P¯ ; (1 + ±); 0
´
> '¯1
³
P®; P¯ ; (1 + ±); 0
´
(corner solution in ®)
7Our de…nition is based on the equilibrium concept used by Cremer and Pestieau,
(1998).
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or
'®1
³
P®; P¯ ; 0; (1 + ±)
´
< '¯1
³
P®; P¯ ; 0; (1 + ±)
´
(corner solution in ¯).
The mobile individual considers the utility levels o¤ered to him in both
countries as given. An interior solution requires that these utility levels are
equal. Alternatively, we can have a corner solution in which all the mobile
individuals are in one of the countries but cannot gain by moving to the
other country.
The di¤erent settings studied below di¤er, in particular, in the coun-
tries’ strategic variables P j’s. In all cases, however, the payo¤s (utility of
each country social planner) are evaluated at the induced migration equi-
librium. Furthermore, we shall determine the Nash equilibrium of the “tax
competition” game. In other words, each country’s strategy must be the
best reply to the other country’s strategy. Consequently, when a country
envisions a variation of its policy, it considers the policy of the other country
as give ·n. However, it does anticipate the migratory adjustment which may
be induced.8
We apply this concept to three settings: a pure redistributive scheme,
a social insurance scheme where only the lower income individuals incurs a
risk of income loss and a social insurance scheme concerning both types of
individuals. The objective function in each country is the sum of utilities of
the natives. This can imply that there is a utilitarian social planner or as
in Wildasin (1991), that the higher wage individuals are in control and are
altruistic. Observe that even though governments care only about natives,
8Formally, the equilibrium is de…ned exactly like in Cremer and Pestieau (1998). In
most of the settings considered below the policy of one of the countries is exogenously
given. Consequently, determination of the Nash equilibrium e¤ectively reduces to the
determination of one the other countries best reply.
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we assume that it cannot discriminate between natives and immigrants when
it comes to the implementation of its policies.
Throughout the paper, we focus on the case where there is a single
country of each type. This is equivalent to a setting where there are several
countries of each type who coordinate their policies. In the several country
case, when countries of a given type do not coordinate, some results may
change but the qualitative conclusions remain valid. We formally study the
multiple country case in the …rst of the considered settings; see Subsection
3.2. In the other cases, this extension can be studied along the same lines
and we shall only sketch its main implications.
3 Pure redistribution scheme
3.1 Basic model
Let us …rst consider a purely redistributive policy consisting of lump sum
taxes and transfers. The social planner in each country has complete infor-
mation. This setting can be interpreted in two di¤erent ways. The most
straightforward interpretation is to assume that there is no risk of incurring
a loss and, hence, no need for social insurance of any kind. Alternatively, one
can think of this setting as representing a case of ex post mobility. In other
words, individuals can move after the relevant random variable is realized.
The poor in our model are then the individuals who have been unlucky (or
in bad health) in the past.
With such a scheme, there is a lump-sum tax Ti which must balance the
government’s budget:
T j1 N
j
1 + T
j
2 = 0:
By de…nition, in country ®; T®i = 0; the Bismarckian country does not
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redistribute. In country ¯; each individual has a strictly concave utility
function u(y¯i ) where y
¯
i is disposable income: y
¯
1 = w1 + T
¯
2 =N
¯
1 and y
¯
2 =
w2 ¡ T ¯2 :
In this setting, where country ® does not redistribute, the reservation
utility for lower ability workers living in ¯ is just ¹u®1 = u (w1), the utility
of their counterparts in ®. The strategy of the Bismarckian country is here
exogenously given (T®i = 0). To determine the “Nash equilibrium” it is then
su¢cient to determine country ¯’s best reply to this strategy. To do so, we
…rst have to consider the migration equilibrium induced by a given T¯2 . This
yields the following results:
² When T ¯2 = 0, there is a continuum of interior equilibria; eN¯1 is unde-
termined and irrelevant for the country’s objective.
² When T ¯2 > 0 we have eN¯1 = (1 + ±): a corner solution with all the
poor living in ¯.
Observe that T ¯2 < 0 (a transfer to the rich, implying a tax on the mobile
poor) is not a feasible strategy. It would only be feasible for eN¯1 > 0; but
this is impossible with T ¯1 > 0. In words, a tax on the poor would make
them worse o¤ than in the Bismarckian country and they would all leave.
Consequently, the subsidy to the rich cannot be …nanced.
We now consider the optimal choice of T ¯2 given these migration equilib-
ria. It can be determined by the maximization of:
$ = u
³
w2 ¡ T ¯2
´
+ u
Ã
w1 +
T ¯2
(1 + ±)
!
: (1)
9
Observe that this expression is also valid for T ¯2 = 0.
9 We obtain T ¯2 > 0 if
@$
@T ¯2
¯¯¯¯
¯
T
¯
2 =0
= ¡u0 (w2) + u
0 (w1)
(1 + ±)
> 0 (2)
or
u0 (w1)
u0 (w2)
> (1 + ±): (3)
In that case, T ¯2 > 0 is the solution of:
(1 + ±)u0
³
w2 ¡ T ¯2
´
= u0
Ã
w1 +
T¯2
(1 + ±)
!
: (4)
The equilibrium implies a positive level of redistribution in the Beveridgean
country which then attracts all the poor. Alternatively, if
@$
@T ¯2
¯¯¯¯
¯
T
¯
2 =0
< 0
we have T ¯2 = 0. Then there is no redistribution in either of the countries.
The migration equilibrium is not uniquely determined, but it includes N¯1 =
1, that is no migration.
Let us now compare this equilibrium with the outcome in autarky. In
the absence of mobility, there is full redistribution: y¯1 = y
¯
2 and T
¯
2 =
(w2 ¡ w1)=2; recall that individuals have the same preferences, that the
planner uses a utilitarian social welfare function, and that there are no labor
market distortions. With mobility, we have either:
² Incomplete redistribution and all poor in the Beveridgean
country: T ¯2 > 0 but y
¯
2 > y
¯
1 and N
¯
1 = 1 + ±. There is redistribu-
tion in the Beveridgean country, but it does not result in a complete
9The migration equilibrium is not unique, but all equilibria give the same level of
welfare.
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equalization of income levels (unlike in the closed economy setting).
This case occurs under condition (3), that is when w1 and w2 are suf-
…ciently di¤erent, when u is su¢ciently concave and when ± is not
too large. All lower wage individuals are in country ¯ where there
continues to be some redistribution. Redistribution is, however, less
important than under autarky. This is because it is now more “costly”
to redistribute. Every dollar collected from the rich is shared between
the (1 + ±) poor, but only part of these (namely the natives) are ac-
counted for in the social welfare function. For instance if ± = 1, only
half of the tax revenues go to native poor. This ratio between resident
poor and native poor acts like a price term in condition (4).
² No redistribution and no migration:10 T ¯2 = 0. This case arises
when (3) is violated: there is not much wage heterogeneity, utility is
not too concave or ± is large. Redistribution is now too costly and the
best strategy is to give up redistribution altogether.11
3.2 Variant with several countries of each type
Before proceeding let us brie‡y revisit the assumption that there is a single
country of each type. Speci…cally, assume that there are J identical countries
of type ¯ and K countries of type ®. Now we are dealing with a fully ‡edged
Nash equilibrium (with strategy space (T1; T2)), which can no longer be
determined by looking at the best reply of a single country.12
10Strictly speaking the migration equilibrium in not unique here. However, no migration
is the only equilibrium if there is a positive (possibly in…nitesimal) moving cost.
11As a matter of fact, the Beveridgean country would now want to redistribute from
the poor to the rich, but this is not possible because the mobile poor cannot be taxed.
12See conditions (15)–(17) of Cremer and Pestieau (1998) for a precise de…nition. Ob-
serve that because each country takes the other countries policy as given it e¤ectively
takes the utility of the mobile households in the other jurisdictions as given.
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The following property is useful to determine the types of equilibria that
can arise: a situation where the poor are equally distributed between Bev-
eridgean countries and where T ¯2 > 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
13 To see
this, observe that each of the countries would gain by “undercutting” the
others, i.e. by inciting the poor to move to the other countries through
a marginal change in policy (namely a reduction in taxes). This does not
change the utility of the poor natives of the considered country but makes
the rich better o¤. The same argument can be applied to any other sit-
uation where more than one Beveridgean country has poor residents. On
the other hand, the case where a single Beveridgean country hosts all the
poor can (potentially) be an equilibrium. The other Beveridgean countries
have clearly no incentive to deviate, nor do the Bismarckian countries. The
country who has the poor residents, on the other hand, faces exactly the
same tradeo¤ as in the single Beveridgean country case above; in particular,
all the other countries (whatever their type) o¤er T2 = 0.
To sum up, when there are several countries who do not coordinate their
policies, there are again two types of equilibria. The …rst type would imply
all poor in a single Beveridgean country, i.e., T2 > 0 for one of the Bev-
eridgean countries and T2 = 0 for all the others. The second type implies
T2 = 0 for all countries and is the exact counterpart to the “No redistribu-
tion and no migration” regime considered above.
The interesting feature is that the second type (no redistribution no
migration) of equilibrium now e¤ectively becomes “more likely”. To see this
observe that the welfare of the single Beveridgean country which hosts all
the poor is now given by
13More formally: the migration equilibrium induced by the Nash equilibrium taxes can
be interior only then T¯2 > 0 (i.e., when no redistribution occurs).
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u
³
w2 ¡ T ¯2
´
+ u
Ã
w1 +
T ¯2
(J± + K)
!
;
which generalizes (1). Observe that (J± +K) is the total number of poor in
the economy. It then follows that the conditions for T¯2 > 0 is now given by
u0 (w1)
u0 (w2)
> (J± + K):
Compared to (3), the presence of several countries thus increases the RHS of
the expression, making the condition more stringent. This is not surprising.
The single country which redistributes now attracts the poor not just from
the Bismarckian countries, but also from the other Beveridgean countries.
And the more countries there are, the more likely it becomes that the out-
come for the redistributive Beveridgean country will be dominated by a no
redistribution policy.
4 Social insurance of the poor
Let us now move from lump sum redistribution to social insurance and
suppose that some individuals face the risk of losing their earning ability.
We now assume that mobility (if any) takes place ex ante, that is before the
realization of the risk.14 In a …rst step, we assume that only the lower wage
individuals incurs a such risk; consequently, they are the only ones who
can bene…t form social insurance. This may occur when the higher wage
individuals have their own private insurance, but are forced to contribute to
the public scheme. For simplicity, we assume that loss probability is given
14With ex post mobility, we would essentially return to the lump-sum setting, at least
within our simple framework; see Sections 3 and 6 for additional discussion.
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by ¼ = 1=2: We introduce a social insurance paying a bene…t equal to D
and being …nanced by a proportional payroll tax ¿:15
In country ¯, both types of workers contribute to the system so that:
N¯1 D
2
=
Ã
N¯1
2
w1 + w2
!
¿:
In country ®, the lower wage individuals are the only contributors given
the Bismarckian rule. Therefore, with our assumption that ¼ = 1=2, the
problem for the social planner reduces to maximizing:
2u®1 = u (w1 (1 ¡ ¿®1 )) + u (¿®1w1) ;
which yields, ¿®1 = 1=2 and u
®
1 = u (w1=2) = u
®
1 : This e¤ectively implies
that individuals have full insurance; consumption is the same in all states
of nature. There is, however, no redistribution; consumption levels di¤er
between types. Observe that the problem of country ® is independent of
the policy of country ¯. To determine the Nash equilibrium, it is then once
again su¢cient to calculate the best reply of ¯ to a given strategy of country
®, namely ¿®1 = 1=2, and for a given reservation utility level of the poor, u
®
1 .
In country ¯, the payroll tax applies to all individuals at rate ¿¯ and
social welfare can be written as:
U¯ = u
³
w2(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
+
1
2
h
u
³
w1(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
+ u
³
¿¯y(¿¯)
´i
;
where
y(¿¯) =
eN1(¿¯)w1 + 2w2eN1(¿¯) (5)
is the tax base for …nancing social insurance, which is de…ned so that D = ¿y.
15Throughout the paper we assume that the number of residents per country is su¢-
ciently large for the law of large numbers to apply. Consequently 1=2 is not only the loss
probability, but also the proportion of individuals who e¤ectively incurs a loss.
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We now show that two alternative outcomes are possible. The …rst
possibility is that all low-wage people are in country ¯ which o¤ers a positive
level of insurance (and redistribution) . The second possibility is that country
¯ sets its tax and social protection at zero, in which case all the poor move
to the Bismarckian country. To achieve this we shall proceed by eliminating
the other potential outcomes. First, we show that a solution implying an
interior migration equilibrium is not possible.
Proposition 1 A tax ¿¯ which induces an interior migration equilibrium,
i.e., which is such that
0 < eN¯1 ³¿¯´ < 1 + ± (6)
cannot be the best reply of country ¯: Consequently, the Nash equilibrium
tax rates necessarily induce a corner solution for the migration equilibrium.
Proof : First observe that (6) requires ¿¯ > 0; when ¿¯ = 0, the poor
are necessarily better o¤ in ®. Given risk aversion, full insurance dominates
no insurance. Next, (6) implies u¯1 = ¹u
®
1 : In other words, low productivity
individuals in ¯ have the same expected utility as their counterparts have
in ®: With u¯1 …xed, one has:
@U¯
@¿¯
= ¡u0
³
w2(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
w2 < 0
and thus any ¿¯ > 0 cannot be optimal. ¥
The intuition behind this result is quite simple. Recall that the rich do
not need any social insurance; the utility of the rich is thus maximized when
the tax is zero. Now, when the migration equilibrium is interior, the utility
level of the poor is e¤ectively given; it is not a¤ected by a marginal change
in the tax rate. But then a decrease in the tax is always welfare improving.
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We are thus left with two possibilities: either ¿¯ > 0 with N¯1 = 1 + ±
and all poor in Beveridge, or ¿¯ = 0 with N¯1 = 0 and all poor in Bismarck.
16
We consider these two cases in turn.
² All poor in Bismarck: N¯1 = 0:
In that case, ¿¯ = 0; u¯1 < u
®
1 : Then social utility is:
U¯ = u (w2) + u (w1=2) : (7)
Recall that government objective functions focus only on natives.
² All poor in Beveridge: N¯1 = 1 + ±.
In that case, the tax base is:
y(¿¯) = w1 +
2
(1 + ±)
w2;
and ¿¯ must be such that:
1
2
u
³
w1(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
+
1
2
u
µ
¿¯
µ
w1 +
2
(1 + ±)
w2
¶¶
> u (w1=2) : (8)
Inequality (8) states that the poor are e¤ectively better o¤ in country
¯ than in ®. It is always satis…ed for ¿¯ = 1=2. Let E be the set of
all tax rates for which (8) is satis…ed.
The tax rate applied in the Beveridgean country and the induced migra-
tory solution can then be determined by comparing:
U¯E = max
¿¯2E
u
³
w2(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
+
1
2
u
³
w1(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
+
1
2
u
µ
¿¯
µ
w1 +
2
(1 + ±)
w2
¶¶
(9)
16One can easily show that ¿¯ = 0 with N¯1 = 1+ ± cannot occur; with a zero tax in ¯
the poor will not move to this country. Similarly, ¿¯ > 0 with N¯1 = 0 cannot arise; when
all the poor are in ® there is no reason for the social planner in ¯ to levy a positive tax.
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and
U¯0 = u (w2) + u (w1=2) :
When U¯E > U
¯
0 , the Beveridgean country sets a tax rate such that it at-
tracts all the poor. This is the outcome which is consistent with the initial
intuition. However, when U¯E < U
¯
0 , a more surprising equilibrium occurs.
The Beveridgean country will now set a zero tax and thus o¤er no social
insurance at all. All the poor then move to country ® where they can get
full insurance but do not bene…t from any redistribution.
Observe that when ¿¯ is on the frontier of E, eN1 = 0 dominates eN1 =
1 + ±: To get further insight, and to show that the two cases are e¤ectively
possible, consider the case of logarithmic utility. In that particular case, the
value of ¿¯ that maximizes (9) is 1=4. When ± = 1 (the countries are of
equal size) one easily checks that inequality (8) is always satis…ed and that
U¯E < U
¯
0 occurs if (and only if) w2 < 1:37w1. This is quite an intuitive
result. When the gap between the two levels of productivity is not large
enough, the Beveridgean “social planner” …nds it desirable to let its lower
productivity citizens migrate to the Bismarckian country where at no cost
they bene…t from a self-…nanced complete insurance. Further observe that
the range of wage di¤erential for which this result occurs becomes larger
as ± increase. This is because a larger level of ± makes it more costly to
accommodate all the poor: U¯E decreases (while U
¯
0 does not change).
This result is interesting as it indicates that with labor mobility all the
lower productivity individuals do not necessarily reside in the Beveridgean
country. It is dependent on the assumption that the higher productivity
individuals do not bene…t from social insurance. On the other hand, the
result does not depend on the single Beveridgean country assumption.17
17With several countries the second type of equilibrium once again implies that all the
17
As a matter of fact, the larger the number of non-cooperating Beveridgean
countries, the more costly it becomes for a single country to host all the
poor. Consequently, it becomes more attractive to discourage the poor and
incite them to move to another country.
5 Social insurance for all
Let us now turn to the case where both types of individuals, the rich and
the poor, can incur a loss for which no, or at least no complete private
insurance is available. We adopt the simplifying assumption that both types
of individuals have the same probability of loosing their wage, namely ¼ =
1=2. This does not change the behavior of country ® which chooses a tax
rate of 1=2. This imposes a …xed utility to the lower ability individuals:18
u®1 = u (w1=2) = ¹u
®
1 :
In country ¯ the tax base is now given by
y(¿¯) =
eN1(¿¯)w1 + w2eN1(¿¯) + 1 ; (10)
which replaces (5). The problem to be solved now is to maximize:
U¯ =
1
2
h
u
³
w2(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
+ 2u
³
¿¯ y
³ eN1(¿¯)´´ + u ³w1(1 ¡ ¿¯)´i :
The major di¤erence with the case studied in the previous section is that
now an interior solution can no longer be ruled out. Speci…cally, the simple
argument used in the proof of Proposition 1 does not go through here. When
the utility of the poor is given, as is the case at an interior solution, the
poor live in a single Beveridgean country. Observe that the argument ruling out interior
solutions (for migration) remains valid with several countries.
18The country now o¤ers insurance to both types, but this is of no relevance for our
analysis.
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Beveridgean country would still like to “get rid” of its poor. However, it
will no longer want to achieve this by setting a tax rate of zero for this
would e¤ectively deprive the skilled workers from insurance coverage. More
generally, setting a tax which discourages the poor may now also be harmful
to the rich. This does of course not imply that there will be necessarily an
interior solution; however, this possibility now has to be accounted for.
To study the implication of this possibility, suppose that we have an
interior solution such that 0 > eN1 ¡¿¯¢ > 1 + ±: In that case, the utility
of the lower ability workers must be equal to that of their counterparts in
country ®: Namely:
2u¯1 = u
³
w1(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
+ u
³
¿¯ y
³ eN1(¿¯)´´ = 2¹u®1 :
With this constraint, one can rewrite the objective of the planner in the
Beveridgean country, U¯, such that:
U¯I =
1
2
h
u
³
w2(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
¡ u
³
w1(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
+ 4¹u®1
i
; (11)
and the …rst-order condition is given by:
w2u
0
³
w2(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
= w1u
0
³
w1(1 ¡ ¿¯)
´
; (12)
where U¯I denotes the level of utility in this interior case (I for interior).
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Observe that (11) is valid only for tax rates which are such that the (migra-
tion) equilibrium is e¤ectively interior. It is by choosing the tax rate that the
Beveridgean government chooses the migration regime that will be relevant.
To determine its best strategy, we then have to compare the maximum of
(11), that is the best outcome amongst the interior solutions, to the utility
19The second order conditions here require more stringent restrictions than merely con-
cavity. When they are not satis…ed, an interior solution is not possible and we return the
case where only corner solution have to be considered.
19
levels achieved at the two corner solutions, N¯1 = 0 and N
¯
1 = 1 + ±:
20 Not
surprisingly, the comparison is ambiguous at this level of generality. De-
pending on the parameter values and on the utility function both corner
and interior solutions appear to be possible in general.21
To illustrate the choice of the optimal tax rate and the comparison of
utility levels between regimes, let us return to the logarithmic utility. With
this speci…cation, one can easily see from (12) that U¯I is independent of ¿
¯
and is given by:22
U¯I =
1
2
h
ln w2 ¡ ln w1 + 4 ln w1
2
i
: (13)
Consider now the two corner solutions. Keeping the logarithmic utility,
it is straightforward to see that N®1 = 0 is e¤ectively a special case of the
interior solution regime. As to N®1 = 1 + ±, one can easily show that the
optimal tax rate is ¿¯ = 1=2 and that the resulting utility level, denoted U¯c
(c for constraint) is equal to:
U¯c =
1
2
·
ln w2 + ln w1 + 4 ln
1
2
+ 2 ln w1
(1 + ±) + w2=w1
(2 + ±)
¸
: (14)
Using (14) and (13) one shows that:
U¯c ¡ U¯I = 2 ln
(1 + ±) + w2=w1
(2 + ±)
= 2 ln
y(1=2)
w1
> 0; for w2 > w1:
20What is relevant in both case it the maximum level of utility that can be achieved
for a given value of N¯1 (namely 0 or 1 + ±) and with the tax rate restricted to yield the
considered value of N¯1 as the migration equilibrium. When N
¯
1 = 1 + ±, the problem
is very similar to the one considered in the previous section. For N¯1 = 0, however, the
solution is di¤erent; unlike in the previous section we do not obtain ¿¯ = 0 there.
21The three types of solution continue to be relevant for the several country case. Noth-
ing essentially changes if the solution is interior or if all poor move to Bismarckian coun-
tries. For the remaining case, we have again an equilibrium with all the poor in a single
country and this outcome becomes less likely when there are several countries.
22This does not mean that welfare per se is independent of the tax rate. It merely means
that all tax rates which yield an interior solution result in the same level of welfare.
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Consequently, for the logarithmic preferences the optimal strategy is always
to set a tax of 1=2, that is the preferred rate of either group under autarky.
This induces an in‡ow of all the poor from the Bismarckian country which
decreases the utility of the natives in the Beveridgean country. This country
could avoid this immigration by setting a lower tax rate, but this proves to
have an even larger adverse impact on welfare.
6 Extensions and concluding comments
Up to now, we have made several assumptions which may appear somewhat
restrictive. We now discuss how restrictive they e¤ectively are. To do this
we proceed in two steps. First, we sketch some extensions which we have
considered but which are not reported in the main part of the paper. Second,
we revisit some other assumptions which we have not relaxed.
We have considered the alternative speci…cations wherein the social plan-
ner is concerned by the utility of the residents and not by that of the natives.
Basically, the nature of the results does not change. We show for the pure
redistributive scheme that the most likely case is that all poor reside in the
Beveridgean country. We have something which looks like the repugnant so-
lution in population economics: the social planner prefers a large number of
residents consuming little over a small number consuming a lot.
We have also considered the mobility of the rich. In this case, the problem
is rather di¤erent. Typically there is then a single type of equilibrium in
which all the rich locate in the Bismarckian country.
Let us now turn to the other assumptions and try to understand their
impact even though we do not have formal results. First, by assuming …xed
wages levels, we assume away any complementarity between the two types
of labor. Clearly, this assumption allows for corner solutions.
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Second our analysis was restricted to pure Bismarckian and Beveridgean
systems. With encompassing bene…t rules such as studied by Cremer and
Pestieau (1998), we contrast countries which are relatively more Bismarckian
than others. The analysis then gets much more complex as we cannot rely
on a …xed reservation utility that results from a pure Bismarckian regime.
Third, in the sections where social insurance is explicitly introduced we
have assumed that individuals move ex ante, prior to disability and prior
to paying taxes. As argued earlier, the lump-sum redistribution setting
can be interpreted as a stylized setting of ex post mobility; see Section 3.
However, in reality intermediate cases, where people who migrate already
know something (but not everything) about their future earnings prospects,
are probably the most relevant. One can hope that the pattern of equilibria
achieved in the extreme cases, can provide us with some indication about the
outcome in the intermediate case. However, to obtain more precise insight,
one would need to consider a model much more sophisticated than ours and
which incorporates some dynamic structure.
Finally, there is the assumption that the bene…t rule is given. We did so
because we wanted to concentrate on one speci…c problem. In other words,
our model is meant to be a building block of a more ambitious setup, en-
compassing a broader range of decision variables. Implicitly, we are thinking
of a sequential decision process. Bismarckian systems on the one hand and
Beveridgean systems on the other hand imply speci…c institutional and ad-
ministrative arrangements which cannot be overturned in the short run.
In countries like France and Germany, the Bismarckian system is solidly
anchored in the tradition and concern not only the bene…t rule of social in-
surance but also the working of the labor market. For the UK, on the other
hand, the Beveridgean tradition is also a strong part of the political and
22
social life.
In earlier papers, we have discussed the choice of the bene…t rule at an
earlier, “constitutional”, stage. Decision at this stage can be made either
by a welfare maximizing authority or through a voting procedure. In either
case, decisions in the …rst stage are contingent on the induced outcome in
the second stage. Consequently, the characterization of the outcome for any
given bene…t rule, Bismarckian or Beveridgean, is a necessary step in the
analysis. The di¢cult problem that we have not yet studied is why two
countries end up choosing completely di¤erent bene…t rules. We know that
this is the case in reality. But theoretically, this is not a natural outcome
except if we introduce explicitly given di¤erences arising from, say, history.
Summing up, let us return to the conventional wisdom alluded to in the
introduction. According to this view, when unskilled labor becomes more
mobile, tax competition is enhanced and countries with Beveridgean social
insurance will end up welcoming all the unskilled workers and hence e¤ecting
less redistribution than in the absence of labor mobility. In this paper, we
have examined the validity of this conjecture within a simple model of tax
competition and labor mobility between a purely Bismarckian country and a
purely Beveridgean country. It is shown that mobility does have a signi…cant
impact on social protection and that the conventional wisdom is valid in
a number of possible settings. However, the equilibrium patterns that can
emerge are more complex and diversi…ed than the initial conjecture suggests.
In some cases, and in particular when the higher income people do not incur
large risk or when they can self-insure, the equilibrium may even imply that
all the poor move to the Bismarckian country. Then, the unskilled workers
are insured but without cross-subsidization from the skilled workers.
23
References
[1] Casamatta, G., H. Cremer and P. Pestieau (2000), Political sustainabil-
ity and the design of social insurance, Journal of Public Economics, 75,
341–346.
[2] Casamatta, G., H. Cremer and P. Pestieau (2001), Demographic Shock
and Social Security: A Political Economy Perspective, International
Tax and Public Finance, 8, 417-431.
[3] Cremer, H., V. Fourgeaud, M. Leite Monteiro, M. Marchand and P.
Pestieau (1996), Mobility and redistribution: A survey of the literature,
Public Finance, 51, 325-352.
[4] Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (1998), Social insurance and labor mobility.
A political economy approach, Journal of Public Economics, 68, 397-
420.
[5] Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (2000), Reforming our pension systems: Is
it a political, demographic or …nancial problem ? European Economic
Review, 44, 974–984.
[6] Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (2003), Factor mobility and redistribution:
a survey, mimeo, IDEI University of Toulouse.
[7] De Donder, P., and J. Hindriks (1998), The political economy of tar-
geting, Public Choice, 95, 177–200.
[8] Esping-Andersen, G. (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
24
[9] Goerke, L.(1999), Bismarck versus Beveridge: Flat rate and earnings
related unemployment insurance in an e¢ciency wage framework, un-
published manuscript.
[10] Hau‡er, A., (2001), Taxation in a Global Economy, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
[11] Wellich, D., (2000), The Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State,
New York, Cambridge University Press.
[12] Wildasin, D. (1991), Income redistribution in a common labor market,
American Economic Review, 81, 757–774.
25
